Head of the HACC: ‘The Lack of a Stable Political Consensus in Favour of Independent Anti-Corruption Justice Poses a Risk to the Court’

Head of the HACC: ‘The Lack of a Stable Political Consensus in Favour of Independent Anti-Corruption Justice Poses a Risk to the Court’

Vira Mykhailenko, Head of the High Anti-Corruption Court. Photo: Watchers

On the eve of parliamentary consideration of the presidential draft lawon restoring the independence of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, Watchers publishes an in-depth interview with Vira Mykhailenko, Head of the High Anti-Corruption Court.

We spoke with her before the latest assault on the independence of the anti-corruption bureau and prosecutor’s office. The interview was initiated, inter alia, because the HACC has increasingly reported pressure and threats to its independence.

In addition, at the beginning of September this year, it will be six years since the court was launched, which made it necessary to discuss, in particular:

  • the court’s statements about the discovery of video and audio surveillance equipment used to monitor court staff,
  • the practice of determining the amount of bail for suspects and defendants,
  • the consequences for the court of the failure of the first competition to the HACC and its Appeals Chamber,
  • the ratio of conviction and acquittal judgements, etc.

Prior to publication, we also asked the head of the court to answer several questions regarding the current situation. We publish them at the beginning of the interview.

‘The independence and capacity of the HACC to consider such categories of cases stand in the way of many’

In the context of legislative changes aimed at depriving NABU and SAPO of their independence, what will change for the HACC?

I think nothing will change. The court will continue to hear cases in accordance with the law. There may be fewer cases involving certain categories of persons (due to the limitation of the powers of the Head of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office), but there may be more cases involving lower-level officials. 

In your opinion, is there a threat to the functioning of the HACC as a whole? 

Of course, because the independence and capacity of the HACC to consider such categories of cases stand in the way of many. And if we are talking about the systemic dismantling of achievements in the anti-corruption sphere, there may also be consequences for the HACC. One should not forget that the High Anti-Corruption Court was established not thanks to, but despite strong resistance from the system. Thus, the lack of a stable political consensus in favour of independent anti-corruption justice poses a long-term risk to the court.

This may not be about the direct liquidation of the Court, but rather about the gradual erosion of its specialisation through reforms or legislative changes that may appear technocratic and neutral at first glance.

Several media outlets have conducted investigations into information attacks on NABU, SAPO and the HACC ahead of the parliamentary vote on the relevant legislative changes. Have you noticed an information attack against the court? Where did it originate?

Unfortunately, information attacks against HACC judges and the court have existed and most likely will continue as long as the HACC remains effective. They are predominantly based on information manipulation, ‘sensational revelations’ grounded in fabricated or false information, publications in anonymous (in fact, not so anonymous) Telegram channels, research by non-existent experts or experts with questionable competence, or by media representatives engaged by the defence to ‘cover the process’. These campaigns usually bear the hallmarks of coordinated information injections aimed at discrediting the institution, undermining trust in judges and creating in society the image of an ‘ineffective’ or ‘biased’ body. This is not about healthy criticism, but about the systematic formation of false narratives.

It seems to me that these attacks are aimed not so much at destroying the HACC as at calling its legitimacy into question, influencing public opinion and affecting decision-making by other state institutions that shape judicial, personnel or budgetary policy.

Vira Mykhailenko, Head of the High Anti-Corruption Court. Photo: Watchers

‘There is always an attempt to exert a certain degree of pressure on HACC judges’

On 26 May, the HACC published a statement saying that audio and video surveillance equipment had been found in the homes of court staff. According to my information, this concerned an assistant to Investigating Judge Oleh Fedorov. The statement said that criminal proceedings had been opened in connection with this. Who is investigating them and are there any further details?

The investigation is being conducted by NABU (the National Anti-Corruption Bureau — W). That is essentially all I can say at this stage.

Why was this made public a week later, as mentioned in the statement?

It was necessary to clarify all the information and prepare the statement. I cannot comment on anything further because this is a pre-trial investigation secrecy — even for us. However, we see this as interference in the activities of the court, because we do not know for what purpose such equipment was installed, who did it, whether it was authorised and so on.

At least tell us how the equipment was discovered.

By chance… As far as I know, it [the equipment] was not very well hidden. I do not know the remaining details.

Are such cases really under NABU’s jurisdiction? Especially given that NABU may have a conflict of interest, since cases investigated by NABU are heard by the HACC.

NABU is the body to which the report was submitted, and it registered the relevant criminal proceedings. Subsequently, it may either conduct the investigation itself (if a relevant decision is taken) or transfer the case according to jurisdiction. 

Is it indeed about Judge Fedorov’s assistant or someone else? 

For now, we are not disclosing this information. But I am not inclined to believe everything that is being written about this (smiles — W).

Vira Mykhailenko, Head of the High Anti-Corruption Court. Photo: Watchers

A few days after this statement about wiretapping, another situation arose: the State Bureau of Investigation issued a statement regarding the case of the former head of the High Commercial Court, Artur Yemelianov. It claimed that he had allegedly ‘reached an agreement with a judge of the High Anti-Corruption Court’ — referring to Vitalii Dubas, who returned the SBI’s motion to extend pre-trial detention, finding that the case was not within the jurisdiction of the HACC. In response, the court once again stated that pressure was being exerted. 

No law enforcement body may allow itself to comment on specific cases or to suggest any kind of ‘orders’ allegedly given to judges. If there are specific facts, they must be examined within the framework of current legislation, rather than through accusations on Facebook. Judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court fall within the jurisdiction of the State Bureau of Investigation, so that body, if there are grounds, must examine the matter for possible criminal offences. The High Council of Justice also has the relevant powers. And if the issue is disagreement with a court decision, such communication is unacceptable. 

Was there any continuation of this story beyond Judge Dubas’s statement to the High Council of Justice about pressure?

There was discussion, but no reaction. The SBI merely adjusted its original statement on social media.

Is this a conflict? No, I do not see this as a conflict. I am simply an advocate of proper, competent communication between state bodies, regardless of the functions they perform, as well as honest communication with society. 

After this situation, some lawyers noted that the problem lies in the fact that HACC judges do not apply a uniform judicial practice in similar motions. What is your view on this?

This is a systemic problem in Ukraine – the lack of uniformity in judicial practice. It exists in our court as well.

Of course, we try to find common ground, but this is quite difficult because there is no single practice on many issues in higher courts. Otherwise, it would be much easier for us, as first-instance judges, to act in a more unified manner when hearing cases. 

We will return to the issue of uniform practice later in the interview. I would like to go back to those two statements about pressure. Can they be linked? And do you have any assumptions as to why this happened? Perhaps it is connected to the consideration of a particular case.

There is always an attempt to exert a certain degree of pressure on HACC judges. This is, of course, related to the subjects of proceedings whose cases we consider. And people are simply not accustomed to this level of work by a judicial institution.

What do you mean by that?

The cases are high-profile, including those involving top officials. They are genuinely heard and concluded with real verdicts, the overwhelming majority of which enter into legal force.

And who does the HACC stand in the way of?

It seems to me that it stands in the way of almost everyone, perhaps except lawyers. Although they periodically voice certain complaints about the HACC, this field of work is interesting to them, even though it is complex and, of course, defence in top-level corruption cases is well paid. So, I think lawyers are most interested in the HACC continuing to function.

NABU and SAPO are certainly also very interested in the work of the HACC. They were the main advocates of the court’s establishment. Given the number of indictments, they are probably more satisfied with the HACC. 

They are probably interested. And they probably expect greater efficiency from us. The assessment of the effectiveness of our procedural interaction should not be reduced solely to the number of guilty verdicts. The professional and fair work of a court is not only a means of achieving the goals of public prosecution but also a guarantee of due process, adherence to the rule of law and respect for human rights.

We must do our job — administer justice, even if it ends with an acquittal or the closure of a case. And it is encouraging that NABU and SAPO analyse acquittal judgements or rulings refusing their motions and take the court’s positions into account in their subsequent activities. 

From time to time, the public reproaches us, saying there are too few verdicts. But I would like to ask: how many verdicts were there in such cases before the HACC was established? 

Previously, such cases were heard by general courts. And they are overloaded with cases today, which undoubtedly affects the length of proceedings.

Yes, they consider cases of various specialisations. This must be taken into account when discussing the pace of proceedings. 

As for the HACC, we are not baking pastries. People’s lives depend on judicial decisions. If someone has labelled a person a corrupt official, this must not influence us. We must clarify everything, objectively examine the evidence and deliver a balanced and reasoned judgement. Speed must not replace quality. 

I recall that in October 2020, an explosion occurred in the inner courtyard of the HACC, damaging the façade of the building. The police investigated the incident at the time. The court also viewed it as pressure. Are there any results of the investigation?

No results have been achieved. 

Explosion in the inner courtyard of the HACC at 41 Peremohy Avenue, which resulted in damage to the building’s façade, 1 October 2020. Photo: HACC press service

‘The HACC delivers a high percentage of acquittals’

If one compares the ratio of conviction and acquittal judgements, the HACC nevertheless supports the prosecution in the majority of cases. According to official statistics, over the entire period of the court’s operation since September 2019, 289 judgements have been delivered, of which 263 were convictions and 26 were acquittals.

I would not say that the court supports one side. Rather, one party’s position is always more persuasive in terms of the evidentiary basis. Are there any states where courts deliver more acquittals than convictions?

Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of judgements are convictions, the HACC delivers a high percentage of acquittals. This is around 9–12 per cent in different periods.

This figure also periodically decreases due to the conclusion of plea agreements. 

In June this year, the HACC approved plea agreements with seven former senior officials of Odesa City Council accused of misappropriating Odesa Airport, valued at more than UAH 118 million. The public reacts ambiguously to such decisions, presumably believing that these individuals should be convicted.

Plea agreements may be viewed in different ways. However, they represent a saving of procedural resources and an opportunity to achieve greater results with fewer efforts. They also always ensure predictability for the participants in criminal proceedings. If a person has genuinely not committed a crime, the option of full criminal proceedings on the merits always remains available. 

Do you allow for the possibility that plea agreements are, among other things, a consequence of the predominance of guilty verdicts at the HACC? In other words, defendants may fear the risk of real conviction, given that the court most often supports the prosecution.

I am not inclined to think so. Lawyers work very professionally at the HACC, so they are unlikely to agree to such decisions without proper grounds.

In corruption cases, where a preventive measure in the form of detention is chosen, an alternative must always be applied — bail. This is global practice, including recommendations of the European Court of Human Rights. At times, the amounts set by HACC judges surprise outside observers. There is no established practice in this regard, as many factors are taken into account when such decisions are made, including risks, financial status, the gravity of the offence and others.

Please explain whether a single judicial practice can exist at least in cases with similar legal qualifications. Or does it still differ from case to case?

The Criminal Procedure Code establishes a number of criteria that must be taken into account when determining the amount of bail. I believe that by reading a specific decision one can understand the judge’s reasoning.

When determining the amount of bail, not only the elements of the criminal offence are taken into account, but also the individual characteristics of the person (including property status, age and health condition, the strength of social ties), the amount of pecuniary damage allegedly caused, whether the person has previously been held liable and so forth.

In some cases, the amount of bail may appear excessive. However, first, it is immediately paid by the bail providers in most cases and, second, the amount of bail is periodically reviewed and reduced, or another preventive measure is applied. 

At the beginning of my work at the HACC, I tried to develop a certain algorithm — to identify specific criteria for determining the amount of bail. However, this was not successful, as each case contains many individual aspects that must be taken into account.  

Vira Mykhailenko, Head of the High Anti-Corruption Court. Photo: Watchers

Another issue that is debated among legal professionals is whether a judge, when considering a motion for a preventive measure, may, for example, recognise certain evidence as inadmissible. In most cases, judges indicate that such conclusions will be made during consideration of the case on the merits. This is important because the application of a preventive measure effectively constitutes recognition of the validity of the suspicion.

There are many discussions on this issue within the legal community. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, the investigating judge is a subject of evidence assessment and, in my view, in certain cases may recognise evidence as manifestly inadmissible. Such practice is not widespread, although there are isolated decisions to this effect. In general, however, this power belongs to the court when delivering a decision in the case.  

Observing court hearings, it sometimes appears that judges more often side with the prosecution, especially when considering defence motions, which are mostly dismissed. In particular, in my experience, judges very rarely grant recusals of themselves or of prosecutors or detectives. In most cases, such motions are submitted by defence lawyers. As a rule, this is some kind of ‘formality’ accompanying the start of court proceedings.

In fact, situations vary. For example, hundreds of complaints and motions, including those concerning the lawfulness of obtaining evidence, are most often submitted during the preparatory court hearing. However, the preparatory hearing has a completely different content and purpose — it is not intended to examine the correctness of the actions of the pre-trial investigation body or the relevance, admissibility, credibility and sufficiency of evidence. It is intended for the court to determine whether the case can be scheduled for trial and then, during the trial, to resolve substantive issues, including those relating to evidence that must first be examined in order to be assessed and to form the basis of a decision. As for recusals, doubts as to a judge’s impartiality are most often entirely subjective, quite frequently amount to disagreement with earlier decisions and, not infrequently, a recusal is declared simply for the sake of declaring it.  

At the Kyiv Polylogue at the beginning of June this year, a member of the High Council of Justice, Serhii Melnyk, stated that the HCJ is increasingly considering complaints alleging ‘judicial tolerance of delays in proceedings, for example through the unfounded granting of recusals or failure to take measures against participants who abuse their rights’. Applicants believe that judges act deliberately to delay the hearing of cases.

Repeated motions for recusal, non-appearance of parties, submission of various certificates irrelevant to the case and so forth — is this the observance of parties’ rights or an abuse of judicial discretion?

On the one hand, the court must provide each party with the opportunity to express its position and submit motions. On the other hand, if procedural conduct is aimed at delaying or blocking judicial proceedings (and such cases are not uncommon), judges have virtually no procedural mechanisms to stop this. The Criminal Procedure Code contains no provision recognising certain actions as an abuse of rights. The court may only dismiss a repeatedly declared recusal motion or terminate pleadings if a person goes beyond the scope of the examined evidence and repeatedly fails to respond to remarks.

The presiding judge is entrusted with the duty to manage the course of the hearing. It is the presiding judge who chooses a particular strategy to ensure the sequence and order of procedural actions. When a participant attempts to delay proceedings, for example, by fully quoting legislation, identical positions from various judgements of the European Court or academic sources, or by submitting identical motions, it is evident that the judge must put an end to this, however unpopular it may sound.    

‘[The shortage of judges at the HACC] is extremely critical’

One of the components of the Ukraine Facility (the European Union’s financial assistance programme for Ukraine, providing for EUR 50 billion to support Ukraine’s budget over 2024–2027) is the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the HACC, specifically by increasing the number of judges by 25 positions, including 10 judges of the Appeals Chamber and 15 judges of the first instance. In June, two judges were appointed to the first instance. A new competition has now begun, which the High Qualification Commission of Judges plans to complete in March next year. Accordingly, appointments may take place around mid-2026.

How critical is the shortage of judges at the HACC?

Extremely critical. The NABU plans to increase its staff by 300 employees over three years. This includes personnel who will assist in conducting pre-trial investigations, thereby easing the workload of detectives who carry them out directly. This clearly affects the speed of investigations and, accordingly, leads to an increase in the number of proceedings and indictments coming before the court. 

The High Qualification Commission of Judges has nevertheless launched a repeat competition for the HACC and its Appeals Chamber and, according to preliminary estimates, plans to complete all procedures by March next year. If this does not happen, the mandate of the Public Council of International Experts will expire, and HACC judges cannot be selected without its participation. I am not inclined to believe that the mandate of the PCIE can be extended, so this is the last chance to strengthen the institutional capacity of the HACC.

There is currently much debate about the expediency of involving international experts in judicial selection procedures. What is your view on this?

It is difficult for me to answer this question with regard to all selection procedures. I can only say that the participation of the PCIE in the formation of the HACC and its Appeals Chamber has fully justified itself. Over six years, there has not been a single example of unethical conduct by any HACC judge, although manipulations aimed at discrediting individual judges and the court as a whole are always present. Of course, we should not relax (smiles — W). 

At the beginning of June, representatives of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations sent a letter to the Government proposing a review of judges of the Supreme Court and the High Anti-Corruption Court with the participation of international experts, modelled on the PCIE, without defining the period to be covered by such a review. How do you view this initiative?

This proposal concerns the Supreme Court and higher specialised courts, but at present, the only such court is the HACC. I am unequivocally opposed to this initiative. HACC judges underwent an extremely rigorous and demanding selection process. Over six years of work, there has not been a single case of unethical behaviour by any of us. Even if one assumes that such a review could be possible, there must be clear rules before it begins, because any initiative, even a good one, can become an instrument of pressure. And that frankly frightens me. 

Oath-taking of HACC judges, April 2019. Photo: Presidential Press Service

During a meeting of the relevant parliamentary committee where this initiative was discussed, representatives of the Supreme Court stated that, if such a review were introduced, around 80 judges would resign. What consequences could this have for the HACC?

It is difficult to make predictions regarding the HACC, but we also have judges who are entitled to retire. 

HACC judges, like judges in other courts, are constantly engaged in hearings. Fatigue, exhaustion, the impact of the war and constant information attacks also take their toll. 

In addition, I would like to note that judges’ salaries have been ‘frozen’ for the fifth year in a row, meaning that they have remained at the same level since 2020. Restricting judicial remuneration is an encroachment on judicial independence. 

Therefore, it is difficult to predict how colleagues may react to new ‘bonuses’ in the form of additional reviews.

Cases come before the court involving charges worth millions and billions of Ukrainian hryvnias. If a judge receives a low salary, there will always be a temptation to accept a bribe.

This situation can be viewed from two perspectives. On the one hand, the state must ensure decent remuneration for judges so that the justice system is staffed by the best and most worthy professionals. The terms of remuneration to which the best and the worthy agreed when undergoing demanding competitive procedures cannot be changed to the detriment of judges. On the other hand, if a judge finds the remuneration they agreed to insufficient for administering justice, they can always change their professional path to legal practice, business and so on. While holding judicial office, it is impermissible to act dishonestly by justifying misconduct with inadequate pay or lack of money. 

What salary do you consider appropriate for HACC judges?

It seems to me that the salary set out in the law is appropriate (according to the High Council of Justice, the basic official salary, in particular of a judge of a higher specialised court such as the HACC, is UAH 105,100. Judges may also receive supplements (for length-of-service, allowances and so on — W), but without artificial restrictions on the calculation base (currently the subsistence minimum). The economic situation in the country changes every year and judicial remuneration should also vary in line with these processes. 

Do you think the court as a whole influences the fight against corruption and can its activity be taken into account in such an assessment at all?

The HACC does not fight corruption. The HACC is a judicial body. It assesses the activities of bodies that fight corruption. 

I am categorically opposed to the notion that the HACC is aimed at ‘putting people behind bars’. If ‘putting people behind bars’ is the objective, then courts are unnecessary. One can simply label a person a corrupt official, but where, in that scenario, are the presumption of innocence, human rights, civilisational development and democratic standards? What, then, is the purpose of a court? 

Those who call for swiftly ‘putting people behind bars’ should imagine that the defendant before the HACC is their relative or friend. Would they still demand quick imprisonments? Or would they want the court to carefully assess the evidence and examine the case objectively and comprehensively?  

Courts are blamed for all problems, in particular because a judicial decision is the final stage, the tip of the iceberg. Few people examine what evidence existed, whether law enforcement acted lawfully, whether the case was correctly classified, whether defence counsel delayed proceedings and so on. There are many cases, not only at the HACC, where proceedings end with closure due to the expiry of limitation periods. For example, the Ukrkosmos case, which was heard by the court from 2019 until this year. As a result, one defendant died and another was found guilty but the proceedings were closed due to the expiry of limitation periods.

So, who is responsible for this: the investigation, the defence or the court?

I know that courts are always blamed. When courts apply the law on the mandatory use of an alternative preventive measure such as bail, when they deliver acquittals and when they close proceedings not only due to limitation periods but also on other grounds provided by law. 

If limitation periods have expired and a person has not been punished per se, this does not mean that justice has failed. Justice has functioned.

Certain categories of cases require courts to be given more time for consideration. If you recall the cases concerning false declarations, some cases reached the court just three weeks before the expiry of limitation periods. The court was required to consider them as a panel… Despite the fact that, statistically, the HACC has fewer cases than district courts, these are highly specific cases, involving hundreds of pages of accounting documentation or specialised expert evidence… Judges therefore need more time to establish all the facts.

Precisely in order to ease judges’ workload and ensure that a greater number of cases can be considered simultaneously, we have begun hearing certain cases by a single judge since last year. We are already seeing an acceleration in the pace of proceedings and a reduction in the risk of cases being closed due to limitation periods.  

Does this affect the final decision?  In a panel of three, a majority of judges must still adopt a particular position on the verdict.

I do not think so. The concept of hearing cases as a panel of three was established at the establishment of the court because these are complex top-level corruption cases and such a format served as an additional guarantee of professionalism and protection from undue influence. It is now generally accepted that this additional safeguard has worked and that there is no longer cause for concern. It has therefore exhausted its purpose and certain categories of cases can be heard by a single judge. 

Some lawyers reproach you for participating in events together with the heads of the NABU, the SAPO and the NACP. In their opinion, this may indicate the possibility of extra-procedural communication and thus a potential conflict of interest. 

Both I and many other HACC judges also participate in events attended by lawyers. There is nothing abnormal about this. The time when courts and judges were closed systems is in the past.

For example, your trip to Japan in November last year

This was not a leisure trip. It was a meeting of the Anti-Corruption Task Force for Ukraine (ACT for Ukraine), which brought together representatives of anti-corruption bodies and the HACC, as well as international partners. Within this framework, it was important to provide information on how the anti-corruption system functions in Ukraine, with each body responsible for presenting its own area of activity.

Of course, from time to time I take part in events attended by representatives of the bodies you mentioned. However, these discussions concern working issues and never specific cases.

Representatives of the NACP, the NABU, the SAPO and the Head of the HACC, Vira Mykhailenko (second from the left), Japan, November 2024. Photo: NACP website

And if someone were to manipulate the situation and attempt to discredit you and, through you, the entire court by claiming the opposite?

There are ‘red lines’ that we do not cross in communication at events. The people I engage with — lawyers, prosecutors and judges — are aware of these boundaries. We can discuss issues related to the application of provisions of the CPC (Criminal Procedure Code — W), but without names or cases.

‘There is a noticeable trend: the closer the proceedings come to closing arguments, the stronger the defendant’s desire to defend the Homeland’

How do the consequences of the war affect the consideration of cases — mobilisation or the departure abroad of participants in court proceedings? How many cases have been suspended for these reasons?

Of course, this slows down the consideration of cases.

There is a noticeable trend: the closer the proceedings come to closing arguments, the stronger the defendant’s desire to defend the Homeland.

It is one thing, for example, when a person has been serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine since 2022. It is another when, at the stage of closing arguments, they declare: ‘I am not guilty, but I have been mobilised’. 

In this regard, Parliament supported an initiative whereby, in corruption cases, it is the court that determines whether to suspend proceedings in a particular case due to mobilisation. We often send requests to the Ministry of Defence and to the specific military unit in order to clarify the role of a particular service member and their ability to participate in court hearings in any format. Based on this, we then decide whether to suspend proceedings or continue the hearing.

And what about those who have gone abroad?

Yes, there are those who have left, citing threats to their life and health, including individuals who did not have a lawful right to do so. Some, even when participating in hearings by videoconference, do not provide information on their whereabouts, often referring to alleged persecution. 

Judicial practice in such cases varies. Some judges allow participation using personal technical means and, if the accused does not join the hearing, the case may be heard in their absence. There is an established procedure for criminal proceedings conducted without the participation of the suspect or accused.

‘A judge is valuable because they have the ability to administer justice’ 

In a previous interview with me immediately after your election as the Head of the Court, you said that ‘the role of the Head of the Court is similar to that of a monarch in a constitutional monarchy. Judges have no superior; the Head is a representative of the court who performs administrative functions’. Did your expectations align with the real challenges of this position?

Yes, entirely. Administrative powers take up a great deal of time. At first, all organisational processes moved quickly — the competition, single-judge consideration and logistical support — but more recently they have slowed down. From the court’s side, we have done everything possible; now the matter depends on appropriate decisions by other branches of Government. This concerns, inter alia, a single building for judges of the first instance and suitable premises for the Appeals Chamber. We are even prepared for departments not directly involved in administering justice at first instance to be located separately. This is, of course, not very convenient, but it is manageable. We are in constant communication with ministries and state bodies… At one point, we are offered premises without windows; at another, premises of a broadcasting company covering 80,000 square metres, when the HACC needs only 10,000. I do not believe that the issue of premises cannot be resolved, but it certainly requires substantial effort and possibly unpopular decisions.

Such as?

Such as relocating a governmental authority from large premises that are not fully utilised, or terminating commercial leases on premises owned by state enterprises.

Recently, following the previous competition, two judges joined us. As the number of judges increases, so does the court staff. We barely managed to accommodate them. After the appointment of all the remaining judges (13 in total), we will not have that capacity.

Conducting a competition and appointing judges is not merely a box to be ticked in a list of international commitments. A judge is valuable because they have the ability to administer justice. That requires courtrooms and the ability to hear cases in panels without losing valuable time on logistics and coordinating hearing dates among judges located in different buildings. Ensuring the institutional capacity of the HACC is one of Ukraine’s international commitments. Everyone knows this is a systemic issue, yet there is a pretence that there is no problem with accommodation. 

Does it affect the work of the court that judges have still not been able to elect a Deputy Head of the Court?

If we speak about the court’s work as such, probably not. If we speak specifically about the Head of the Court, then it was difficult at first. Now some processes have been completed, others launched, and we are continuing to move forward with them in a planned manner. However, I hope that we will elect a Deputy Head in the near future.

There have been difficulties several times in finding compromise within the court. Even you yourself were elected Head on the fourth attempt, if I am not mistaken. What is the situation with finding common ground among judges?

To be honest, it varies. Judges are, of course, so overloaded with cases that they do not always have time for communication, even on matters related to cases in which we sit as a panel. Being located in different buildings further complicates communication. As in any collective, there are moments of cohesion and moments of misunderstanding. That is entirely typical of any team. 

When do your powers as Head of the Court expire?

On 14 February next year. 

As of today, are you satisfied with what has been achieved in this position? 

Overall, yes. Of course, this is not personal satisfaction. It is the work of the entire team — judges and court staff. There was some disappointment when the first additional competition to the HACC effectively failed, given how much effort had been invested in the very idea of increasing the number of judges. I hope this will not happen again. 

I am satisfied that the court is provided for at an appropriate level, that single-judge hearing of criminal proceedings has been introduced, and that we continue to work on the concept of single-judge hearing of civil and administrative cases. I am also satisfied that, for now, we have managed to avoid expanding the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court to include consideration of administrative offence protocols drawn up by the NACP (National Agency on Corruption Prevention — W).

Are there many such protocols?

There were various draft law concepts envisaging the consideration of between 200 and 1,800 protocols per year. There were discussions about redistributing these protocols by subject and by composition of offences. For now, we have managed to restrain such a redistribution, as judges’ workload is already quite significant. In addition, on a temporary basis, we are considering cases on the application of sanctions involving the confiscation of assets to state revenue, which are not inherent to the HACC.

How many sanctions cases are coming in?

Recently, not many. We have considered 70, with a few more pending. There are fewer now than at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. However, they require panel consideration, which takes a lot of time. Some cases can be resolved over several hearings, while others take months due to the volume of case files or the number of participants involved. 

Читати по темі